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ABSTRACT. This paper analyses the factors inducing retailers to adopt genetically mod-
ified (GM)-free private standards, using information on 44 retailers operating in 54
countries. Retailers are distinguished between those not using GM ingredients and those
using ingredients which are potentially GM in their private label products. Results from a
binary response model show that many of the drivers highlighted in the empirical litera-
ture, such as historical factors, communication infrastructure and sectorial conditions,
affect the likelihood of adopting GM-free private standards. Moreover, we test addi-
tional hypotheses from the political economy of standards formation and of mass media.
Key results show that a higher share of government-oriented public media reduces
the probability of adopting GM-free private standards, while different genetically mod-
ified organism public standards between home and operating countries increase this
probability.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the adoption of private standards concerning product
attributes has significantly increased. Producers are increasingly asked to
certify their products to comply with specific standards created by firms,
standard setting coalitions (e.g., GFSI) and non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). The goal of private standards is not only to specify the
The views expressed in this article are purely those of the authors and may not
in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European
Commission.
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quality level and safety of food products (e.g., GlobalGAP, BRC, IFS),
but also the attributes of the production process and its environmental
and socioeconomic effects (e.g., Rainforest Alliance and FairTrade). Retail-
ers are driving the creation of private standards as they have first-hand
information on consumers’ preferences towards different product charac-
teristics. Moreover, they have incentives in developing successful market-
ing strategies to communicate private label product attributes. However,
consumer preferences are not the only factor affecting the retailers’ deci-
sions about adopting private standards. The structure of the supply chain,
the public minimum quality standard (MQS) set by the government and
country-specific characteristics also play a fundamental role.
The creation and adoption of private standards has been studied from
different points of view. First, many authors analyzed the effects that
private standards have on producers and smallholders in developing coun-
tries. This literature is mainly based on case studies yielding opposite
effects.1 Second, another strand of literature analyzed the factors inducing
companies to adopt private standards in the agri-food sector. These factors
are firm specific, and are conditioned by the socioeconomic environment
and by public policies. However, the majority of these studies provide qual-
itative analyses and their findings are mainly confined to specific case stud-
ies (Garcı´a Martinez and Poole, 2004; Codron et al., 2005; Mainville et al.,
2005). Third, some authors rely on the organizational innovation theory
to analyze the determinants of the adoption of private standards at the
international level. Within this literature, Neumayer and Perkins (2005)
and Herzfeld et al. (2011) show that established trade relations and histor-
ical links with home countries, as well as infrastructure endowment and
institutional factors, are important determinants of the adoption of private
standards by firms and farms.
Among the different product characteristics, the presence of ingredi-
ents obtained by genetic modification has attracted consumers’ attention.
Despite the fact that genetically modified (GM) crops are successfully
adopted worldwide, many NGOs and green organizations in developed
countries argue that GM crops can have negative effects on the agricul-
tural production system in developing countries and that their effects
on the environment and health are still unclear (Takeshima and Grue`re,
2011), affecting the consumers’ willingness to buy products containing GM
ingredients. As a response to the demand for differentiated products not
containing GM ingredients, in the middle of the 1990s some European
retailers started to adopt certified GM-free private standards, selling pri-
vate label products not containing ingredients obtained from GM crops.
GM-free standards are now increasingly spread worldwide.
Specific studies on GM food private standards are provided by Grue`re
(2006) and Grue`re and Sengupta (2009). The first provides important
insights on the role of public regulation in ensuring consumers’ ‘right
to choose’ among different products in supermarkets; the second studies
the effects of GM-free private standards on policy decisions in developing
1 For a review of this literature, see Maertens et al. (2011).
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countries. However, neither of these two studies provides quantitative
evidence, nor do they explain why retailers may decide to adopt GM-free
private standards.
This paper aims to empirically analyze the factors affecting the retailers’
decision to adopt GM-free private standards, an issue largely ignored in
the present literature on private standards. Our analysis contributes to this
literature in different ways. First, we obtained an original sample of GM
private standards for 44 retailers operating in 54 countries distributed in
all the continents. Second, using this wide sample we tested the hypotheses
highlighted by the empirical literature using a binary response model. We
found that historical, geographical, infrastructure and trade conditions sig-
nificantly affect the retailer decision in adopting GM-free private standards.
Finally, we also tested additional hypotheses formulated by the theoretical
literature on vertical differentiation, and the political economy of private
standard formation and of mass media. Our results show that public own-
ership of media reduces the likelihood that retailers will adopt GM-free
standards. On the contrary, different biotech regulations between the home
and operating country increase the probability of the adoption of GM-free
standards by the retailer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
review the theoretical literature explaining the formation of private stan-
dards and the political economy of mass media. In section 3 we present and
discuss our original sample on retailers’ GM private standards. In sections
4 and 5 we provide hypotheses from the empirical literature and explain
the variables and methodology used in the econometric analysis. Section
6 provides the results and discusses the major findings. Finally, section 7
concludes.
2. Theoretical background
The theoretical analyses of the strategic adoption of private standards
by firms follow two main approaches. The first approach uses ver-
tical differentiation models analyzing the interaction between retailers
and producers to explain the incentives of introducing private stan-
dards in the supply chain. In these models, alliances and bargaining
processes in the supply chain are a tool to soften the price competition
between retailers and to increase profits by product quality differentia-
tion (Spence, 1976). These alliances enhance private standards depend-
ing on the structure of the production sector and of the supply market.
von Schlippenbach and Teichmann (2012) provide important explanations
of the interactions along the supply chain. In their study, private stan-
dards are a tool to improve the retailers’ bargaining position with respect
to producers. In the vertical structure, one retailer sets a relatively high
private quality standard, while a second retailer has an incentive to under-
cut its private quality standard such that the supplier complying with the
lower quality standard loses its outside option, and vice versa. The result
is an improved bargaining position of the low-quality retailer. The verti-
cal differentiation approach is particularly relevant in the case of GM-free
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standards, given that the supply of non-GM ingredients is conditional
to identity preserved (IP) supply channels, which are driven by supply
contracts and product quality certifications.
The second approach focuses on the interaction between firms’ and
governments’ regulations, comparing the welfare effects of public vs.
private standards. Private standards are strategically used by firms to pre-
empt government regulations and to induce low (and less costly) public
MQS (Lutz et al., 2000; Maxwell et al., 2000; McCluskey and Winfree, 2009),
choosing the quality level that minimizes the negative effects on firms’
revenues. Vandemoortele and Deconinck (2013) use a political economy
model to show in which circumstances the retailer chooses a standard
stricter than the public one. The decision depends on the retailer’s market
power and on the political influence of producers. Moreover, other factors
affect the decision of the retailer, such as the possibility for the retailer to
transfer a smaller rent and to shift the implementation cost to producers.
Further important factors affecting the retailers’ decision of adopting
private standards are consumer preferences and quality perception.
McCluskey and Swinnen (2004) analyzed the political economy of mass
media and the consumer’s perception toward biotechnologies. They
showed that mass media ownership in developed countries progressively
shifted from public to private. As a consequence, mass media objectives
also shifted, from political to commercial objectives. The authors argue
that private media tend to publish negative aspects of news items in order
to maximize their profit, according to the ‘bad news hypothesis’; that is,
the marginal value of a piece of information with negative welfare effects
is higher than the marginal value of a piece of information with positive
welfare effects. Thus, private media are more likely to deliver potential
risks associated with biotechnology rather than potential benefits, affect-
ing the consumers’ perception of products obtained with this technology.
Curtis et al. (2008) show that differences in media organization and media
consumption between developed and developing countries can explain the
differences in consumer attitudes toward genetically modified organisms
(GMOs), ceteris paribus. They argue that the higher cost of information in
developing countries, and the consequent lower consumption of informa-
tion on biotechnology, can induce more favorable consumer perception of
GMOs.2 The reason behind this is that media in developing countries are
often controlled by governments and the ideological influence of govern-
ments can increase the positive coverage of information in order to lower
the risk perception of consumers.
The central aim of our analysis is to test the main hypotheses of the
above-mentioned theoretical literature. Specifically, the effects of the inter-
actions between retailers and producers will be tested using the ratio
between the agricultural value added and the food value added. We expect
2 Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2004) provide evidence on the media coverage of biotech
food in two rich markets, the Netherlands and the United States. The authors
show that, in both markets, media were generally negatively reporting on the
potential health risks of biotech food, despite the fact that these risks were not
confirmed.
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that a greater participation of the producers in the food value chain will
promote the adoption of GM-free private standards. Second, the influence
of the mass media structure on private GMO standards will also be taken
into account. In this respect, we expect that the public ownership of mass
media will provide fewer incentives in delivering ‘bad news’, reducing
consumers’ aversion to biotechnology and, in turn, reducing the incentive
for the retailer in adopting GM-free private standards. Finally, the interac-
tion retailer–government will be tested by accounting for differences in the
level of restrictiveness of public GMO standards. A strong heterogeneity
in the public GMO regulation between the home country and the coun-
try where the retailer operates may induce the adoption of the private
GM-free standard to overcome negative effects on retailers’ revenues due
to different levels of public standards across countries.
3. Retailers’ private GMO standards
3.1. Sample selection
We collected an original sample of GMO private standards for 44 retail-
ers groups, consisting of 174 different supermarket brands that include all
types of stores, from hypermarkets to express stores. Our sample repre-
sents about 74 per cent of the world food retailers, ranked according to the
value of retail sales in 2008 (Deloitte, 2009). Table 1 reports the complete list
of retailers in the sample.
We collected publicly available retailers’ statements on their global GMO
policies, applying three different strategies in gathering data. First, we
collected retailers’ statements contained in annual financial and sustain-
ability reports for the year 2009 (published in 2010) or for the closest
year available. Second, we collected similar statements from retailers’ web
pages accessed in the period between April and July 2010. Finally, we con-
tacted the retailers’ customer services in the same period, asking for an
explanation of unclear statements and for missing information.
The focus of the sample is on GM-free standards on private label prod-
ucts, which represent a direct link between supermarkets and suppliers.
Organic products are not treated in the sample, assuming that they are all
GM-free, being subject to certification processes that do not allow for the
use of GM ingredients.
We distinguished between countries where the retailer groups are based
(home country) and countries where the retailer groups have stores (oper-
ating country). Retailers are concentrated in 12 home countries: 26 retailer
groups are based in Europe, 16 in North America and two in Oceania. The
overall 44 retailers have stores in 53 countries, distributed over all the con-
tinents. Table 2 shows the geographical distribution of countries. Almost
half of them are developing or emerging, largely located in Asia and Latin
America.
European retailers have a wider geographical diffusion, with stores in
44 countries. The high internationalization of European retailers could be
due to the internal market structure as well as to historical factors such as
past colonial expansion. In contrast, North American retailers are mainly
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Table 1. List of retailer groups and private GMO standards, ordered by retail sales
according to Deloitte (2009)
Home country Retailer Main markets GMO private standard
1 USA Walmart US, Latin
America
Potential use of
GM ingredients
2 FRA Carrefour Group Europe, Latin
America
GM-free
3 DEU Metro Group Global Potential use of
GM ingredients
4 GBR Tesco Global GM-free
5 USA The Kroger
Company
US Potential use of
GM ingredients
6 DEU Aldi Group Europe, US GM-free
7 DEU Rewe Group Germany, Austria Potential use of
GM ingredients
8 FRA Auchan Group Europe GM-free
9 FRA E. Leclerc Europe GM-free
10 DEU Edeka Group Germany GM-free
11 USA Safeway North America No objection to
GM ingredients
12 FRA Casino Group Europe, Latin
America
GM-free
13 NLD Koninklijke
Ahold
US, the
Netherlands
No objection to
GM ingredients
14 AUS Woolworths Oceania Potential use of
GM ingredients
15 USA SuperValu US Potential use of
GM ingredients
16 AUS Coles Group Australia GM-free
17 GBR J Sainsbury UK GM-free
18 GBR Morrison
Supermarkets
UK GM-free
19 BEL Delhaize ‘Le Lion’ US, Europe Potential use of
GM ingredients
20 FRA Systeme U France GM-free
21 USA Publix
Supermarkets
US Potential use of
GM ingredients
22 CAN Loblaw
Companies
Canada Potential use of
GM ingredients
23 CHE Migros Group Switzerland GM-free
24 ITA CO-OP Italy Italy GM-free
25 GBR Marks & Spencer Global GM-free
26 CHE Co-op
Switzerland
Switzerland GM-free
27 USA Meijer US Potential use of
GM ingredients
28 DEU Tengelmann
Group
Germany GM-free
(Continued.)
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Table 1. Continued
Home country Retailer Main markets GMO private standard
29 SWE ICA Group Sweden, Norway Potential use of
GM ingredients
30 FIN Kesko Finland No objection to
GM ingredients
31 USA Dollar General US Potential use of
GM ingredients
32 GBR Somerfield Stores UK GM-free
33 USA Giant Eagle US Potential use of
GM ingredients
34 USA Whole Foods
Markets
US GM-free
35 ITA Esselunga Italy Potential use of
GM ingredients
36 USA Winn-Dixie US Potential use of
GM ingredients
37 FRA Cora Group Europe GM-free
38 USA ShopRite US Potential use of
GM ingredients
39 USA Hyvee US Potential use of
GM ingredients
40 ITA Mdo Italy GM-free
41 USA Roundy’s
Supermarkets
US GM-free
42 USA Nash Finch
Company
US Potential use of
GM ingredients
43 ITA Selex Group Italy Potential use of
GM ingredients
44 CAN Sobeys Canada GM-free
Source: Authors’ own data collection. See text for explanation.
Table 2. Number of countries in the sample grouped into
geographical regions
Operating Markets Developing\Emerging Developed Total
Africa 1 0 1
Asia 8 2 10
Europe 5 21 26
Middle East 2 0 2
North America 0 2 2
Central America 4 0 4
South America 6 0 6
Oceania 0 2 2
Total 26 27 53
Notes: Classification based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
Report, April 2012.
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Table 3. Number of retailers grouped into GMO private standard and
geographical regions
Numbers of retailers
No objections to Potential adoption
Home GM ingredients of GM ingredients GM-free
Europe 2 6 18
North America 1 13 2
Oceania 0 1 1
Total 3 20 21
Source: Authors’ own data collection. See text for explanation.
focused on their domestic markets, since they are present in only 15 coun-
tries of which seven are in South and Central America. North American
retailers can rely on a larger domestic market, which reduces internal
competition and the need for internationalization as a growth strategy.
Note that each retailer may have different standards in the different
countries where it operates. Retailers do not always explicitly provide
information on differentiated standards in the different markets (see next
section for examples of standards’ differentiation); hence we assume that
the global standard is applied in those cases where a more specific standard
is not indicated.3
3.2. Retailers’ private GMO standards
We divided the sample of retailers into three categories (see table 3). Cate-
gory 1 includes retailers not adopting GMO private standards and showing
no objections to the use of GM ingredients. In the second category, retailers
do not have a specific GM-free standard, but they do not label their prod-
ucts as ‘Containing GMOs’, following the country’s regulation on labeling
thresholds. This means that the retailers in category 2 can (potentially)
make use of GM ingredients, but in quantities below the labeling thresh-
old, so that no label is needed, even in a mandatory labeling regime. In
the third category we include retailers stating not to use GM ingredients
in their private label products (GM-free). Not all the retailers in this cate-
gory use GM-free labels. Indeed, many retailers are reticent in committing
to GM-free labels, even if they rely on non-GM IP supply chains to ensure
non-GM ingredients in their products.4
The world top 10 retailers included in our sample are divided over the
categories ‘GM-free’ and ‘potential use of GM ingredients’. None of them is
oriented to the use of GM ingredients. Only three retailers state that they
do not have objections to the responsible use of GM ingredients. Two of
3 In some situations, different standards may be applied even at the regional level.
For example, Edeka does not have a common policy for Germany. The policy
differs by region as Edeka is divided in south, north, west and east Germany.
4 In order to provide a more comprehensive picture, we decided to collect retail-
ers’ internal policy statements rather than the simple adoption of GM-free labels,
because the latter can show only partial GM-free private strategies.
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them (Safeway and Kesko) operate only on the local markets, suggesting
that their decision is closely linked to local consumers’ preferences. The
third (Koninklijie Ahold) operates in the Netherlands and in the United
States, which are more open to the use of GMOs. Moreover, the Ahold’s
position on GM ingredients takes into account the local regulations (see
table 4), adapting its strategy to the consumers’ preferences in the different
countries.
There are 20 retailers in category 2, the majority of whom are based in
North America.5 Their behavior is particularly sensitive. Many retailers are
not willing to take a defined position on GMOs – i.e., adopting GM-free
labels – because of uncertainties on both the supply and the demand side.
On the one hand, a firm which adopts the GM-free label must purchase
constant amounts of non-GM IP ingredients from one year to the next,
and this is not easy to achieve on the traditional markets. To be provided
with constant amounts of non-GM IP ingredients, the firm must create new
and reliable supply channels that are conditional on business-to-business
contracts and on certifications. Moreover, these supply channels increase
economic and logistic burdens due to IP and product traceability. On the
other hand, the label ‘Containing GMOs’ can be perceived by consumers
as a hazard warning, even if the GM ingredients have been approved by
the regulatory institutions after a health and environmental risk assess-
ment. This warning effect can affect not only the sales of the labeled
product, but also the consumer’s perception of the retailer’s overall ‘way
to do business’. Hence, many retailers prefer to remain on the ‘safe side’,
continuing to purchase the ingredients for their private label products
on the traditional market and building the consumer’s confidence by
relying on the public regulation remaining below the labeling threshold
(Tillie et al., 2012).6
Moreover, there is a substantial difference in labeling GM-free animal
products such as meat, eggs and dairy rather than plant products such as
fresh produce and cooking oil made from corn and soybeans. While the
latter may directly contain detectable GMO traces, the former consists of
products from animals fed with non-GM feed, and it is impossible to detect
GMO traces in the final product. Therefore, the certification for labeling
animal products relies exclusively on the segregation of the supply chain.
5 Using the same methodology described in section 3.1, we also checked the atti-
tude on the use of GM ingredients of some major food multinationals (Nestle´,
Kraft, Unilever and PespiCo) and fast-food restaurants (McDonald’s, Starbucks
and Pizza Hut). Both food multinationals and fast-food restaurants fall into
category two. In particular, fast-food restaurants are more consumer oriented,
explicitly declaring that the major factor driving their GM standards is consumers’
preferences. For example, McDonald’s uses GM-free ingredients in its European
restaurants, while it does not apply this standard in the United States.
6 The threshold established by the European regulation (above which a product
must be labeled as containing GMOs) is 0.9 per cent, while it is 1 per cent in China,
Australia and Brazil, 3 per cent in South Korea and Malaysia, and 5 per cent in
Japan and Indonesia. The United States and Canada have a voluntary labeling
regime.
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Table 4. Examples of retailers’ statements on GMO private standards
Home
Retailer country Statement on GMOs Source
ALDI Australia (ALDI
Group)
Germany ‘We have achieved “green” status for our Genetically
Modified (GM) policy in Greenpeace’s True Food
Guide. ALDI complies with all existing regulatory
requirements pertaining to GM as stated in the
Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code. ALDI
does not stock any products which are labeled as
containing GM ingredients.’
ALDI Australia website
(accessed 28 May 2010)
DIA (Carrefour Group) France ‘. . . DIA complies with current legislation, guarantee-
ing that products do not consist of, nor have they
been produced from, ingredients that contain more
than 0.9% GMO. To guarantee its compliance, the
company demands certificates from all its suppliers
and carries out periodic analyses of all its products.’
DIA Annual Report, 2007
J Sainsbury UK ‘At Sainsbury’s we do not permit the use of genetically
modified crops, ingredients, additives or derivatives
in our own-brand food, drink, pet food, dietary
supplements and floral products. We work closely
with our suppliers, who are subject to our strict
approval and audit processes, to ensure that our
GM policy is adhered to at every step of the supply
chain. We require the supply chain to be identity
preserved.’
Media FAQs, November 2009
E
nvironm
entand
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conom
ics
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Royal Ahold Netherlands ‘Where there are clear, demonstrable benefits
to consumers, Ahold has no objections to the
responsible use of safe biotechnology. Products
we offer which are made with this technology are
products which are approved by the authorities,
based on a safety and environmental impact
assessment. We differentiate our assortment from
country to country in line with consumer demand.’
Ahold website (accessed 7
April 2010)
Safeway USA ‘Today’s agricultural and food industries are using
genetic engineering to develop new and better foods
and food-related products. [. . . ] You may not be able
to tell when you’re buying GM foods, because the
FDA generally doesn’t require manufacturers and
producers to label them as such. That’s because GM
foods are considered no different in quality or safety
from conventionally produced foods.’
Safeway website (accessed 5
June 2010)
Tesco UK ‘We have a non-GM ingredient policy for our own-
brand foods in 11 of the countries in which we
operate. [. . . ] In China and the US we do allow some
GM ingredients in our own-brand products. In the
US, due to high levels of GM soy and maize, it
would be virtually impossible to segregate products
according to whether they did or did not contain
GM ingredients.’
Corporate Responsibility
Report, 2009
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This involves more actors (from the collection, transportation, storage and
compound feed sectors), each of them representing a potential source of
admixture between GM and non-GM grains and subject to laboratory
analyses to check compliance with non-GM requirements.
There are 21 retailers who have a GM-free standard (category 3), the large
majority of whom are based in Europe. European retailers have driven the
adoption of GM-free labels since the early 2000s. In 2004 Austria and Ger-
many adopted the Gentechnik-frei erzeugt (GM-free produce) label for animal
products, like dairy, poultry and pork, which progressively spread to other
EU countries. In 2008 Germany enforced the EGGenTDurchfG Act that pro-
vided a legal base to GM-free labels.7 More recently, in January 2012, France
adopted a new decree (Sans OGM) that establishes rules for GM-free labels
at national level. These two regulations will likely boost the adoption of
GM-free labels in other European countries as well.
The fact that most European retailers have a GM-free standard and that
the European retailers included in category 2 remain below the 0.9 per cent
threshold suggests that GM private standards in Europe are stricter than
public ones, in line with the theoretical findings of Vandemoortele and
Deconinck (2013). However, this is not the case for North American retail-
ers. According to public regulation, US and Canadian supermarkets do not
adopt specific standards on GM ingredients.
As already mentioned in the previous section, retailers’ private stan-
dards may change in different markets, adopting the best strategy accord-
ing to consumer preferences and public standards. For example, Tesco,
which has its core business in Europe, adopts a GM-free standard globally,
with the exception of China and the United States where Tesco allows the
use of GM ingredients (table 4). In the same way, Delhaize avoids adopting
specific GM standards, except in Europe where it adopts a GM-free private
label.
Finally, some retailers belonging to the same group apply different
approaches. For example, the Walmart Group has stores all over the world,
but only in the UK was a GM-free standard implemented under the brand
of ASDA. DIA, which is part of the Carrefour Group, declares compli-
ance with public regulation while Carrefour sells GM-free private label
products. Similarly, while Ahold’s global position is rather open to biotech-
nologies, Ahold’s joint venture Jero´nimo Martins, with stores in Poland
and Portugal, has a GM-free standard.
4. Hypotheses and data description
From the sample described above, we developed a binary dependent vari-
able based on the retailers’ statement about GMO private standards. While
the meaning of a GM-free standard is straightforward, for the empirical
7 The German Law on the Execution of Genetic Engineering, i.e., EG-Gentechnik-
Durchfuehrungsgesetz (EGGenTDurchfG), was passed in 2004 as the implemen-
tation of the EU regulation 1829/2003/EG. However, only in 2008 could food
products be labelled as GM-free (Ohne Gentechnik) under the EGGenTDurchfG
act.
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Table 5. Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables
Variable Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent:
GM-free 338 0 1 0.57 0.50
Independent:
Common language 338 0 1 0.11 0.31
Population 338 13.05 20.99 17.62 1.52
Road 338 0 4.96 1.01 0.91
Telephone 338 1 69.00 38.57 18.05
Agexpsh 338 0.01 0.91 0.20 0.17
Agbilexp 338 0 16.64 8.22 6.28
AgshEUJ 338 0.005 0.95 0.22 0.20
Rule of law 338 1.28 4.45 3.20 0.90
GDPpc 338 5.37 11.09 9.40 1.32
GDPpc2 338 28.79 123.07 90.00 23.13
Green 338 0 2 1.72 0.50
Value added 314 0.01 0.91 0.20 0.17
Press 313 0 1 0.04 0.19
Internationalization 338 1 23 11.79 7.00
Heterogeneous standards 338 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
GMO index 321 0 0.60 0.12 0.15
GMO index instrument 321 0 0.48 0.12 0.16
Notes: See text for variables explanation.
analysis the distinction between category 1 (‘no objection to GM ingre-
dients’) and 2 (‘potential adoption of GM ingredients’) is not similarly
relevant, given that both may imply the use of GM ingredients, at least
in very low quantities below the threshold level. Hence, we combined the
sample into two groups: retailers adopting GM-free standards and retail-
ers not doing so. The resulting categorical variable is called GM-free and
describes the behavior of the retailer concerning GMO private standards
in the countries where it has stores; hence the unit of our analysis is the
pair retailer-country. The dependent variable takes a value equal to 1 if the
retailer uses GM-free ingredients in private label products in the country,
and 0 otherwise.
The explanatory variables are selected on the basis of the theoretical
and empirical literature. Following Herzfeld et al. (2011), we selected four
countries’ characteristics potentially influencing the retailer’s choice to
adopt GM-free standards: historical and geographical conditions, infras-
tructures, sectorial conditions, and the quality of institutions and economic
development. Table 5 reports summary statistics of the variables used.
Historical and geographical factors affect cultural characteristics and
information flows between countries, affecting, in turn, consumers’ pref-
erences and firms’ behavior. Moreover, these factors may ease the
transfer of new technologies and standards explaining their adoption
(Neumayer and Perkins, 2005). To test for historical and geographical con-
ditions, we used two variables. First, a dummy variable on Common
language to control for cultural and historical factors, equal to 1 if home
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and operating country share the official language. We expect that sharing
the official language increases the likelihood of the adoption of the stan-
dard, due to easier transfer of the standard from one country to the other.
Second, we control for the country size using the logarithm of the popula-
tion (Population). The common language dummy variable is taken from the
CEPII Gravity data set developed by Head et al. (2010), while the data on
population is from the World Bank’s WDI database.
Infrastructure factors may affect the adoption of a private standard in
different ways. On the one hand, the country’s provision of transport
infrastructure affects internal and export transport costs, influencing firms’
competitiveness both on the domestic and on the international markets.
Moreover, the provision of transportation infrastructure affects the costs of
segregation between GM and non-GM products carried by the retailer. On
the other hand, information and communication infrastructures are vital to
access information on export requirements and on competitiveness strate-
gies of other firms (Herzfeld et al., 2011). Access to telephones, faxes, email
and internet increases the likelihood of interactions between adopters and
potential adopters in different countries, promoting the global diffusion
of business strategies and standards (Neumayer and Perkins, 2005). The
development of the country transportation infrastructures is taken into
account using the Road density per square kilometer (WDI database), while
we use the Telephone lines per 100 people (WDI database) as a proxy for
information and communication infrastructures.
Sectorial characteristics are mainly captured by the country’s position
on the international markets. International trade is not only a mean for
the exchange of goods and services, but also a source of networks enhanc-
ing the transfer of knowledge and new practices. We used three variables.
First is the agricultural export share (Agexpsh) that measures the relative
importance of agricultural exports with respect to total exports. Coun-
tries with well-established agricultural exports have greater integration in
the international market and higher comparative advantage in agricultural
production (Herzfeld et al., 2011). Second, given that intense trade relations
can induce homogenous organizational practices (Neumayer and Perkins,
2005), we use the logarithm of the agricultural bilateral exports (Agbilexp)
between home and operating country. The final variable is the share of
agricultural products exports on total exports to the European Union, the
United States and Japan (AgexpEUJ). These markets are highly competitive,
promoting product differentiation strategies across retailers. Moreover, the
high-income consumers can be more willing to pay a price premium for
higher quality differentiated products (Grue`re et al., 2009). Trade data are
from the UN COMTRADE, through the WITS service provided by the
World Bank. In order to avoid endogeneity bias, the trade variables are cal-
culated for the year 1995, prior to the introduction of the first commercial
GM crop in 1996.8
8 The first commercially grown GM crop was the Flavr Savr tomato of the Cal-
gene Company in 1994, but its diffusion was limited. The first extensive GM
crop appeared in 1996 – the Roundup Ready herbicide-tolerant soybean of the
Monsanto Company.
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The fourth factor, the institutional environment, can shape market
characteristics influencing retailer behavior. To control the role of public
institutions we used the Rule of law index, from the World Bank Gover-
nance Indicators database (see Kaufmann et al., 2007). This index indicates
the effectiveness and the predictability of the judiciary system and the
enforceability of contracts. It ranges between 0 and 5, with higher val-
ues for higher institutions quality. Empirical evidence suggests that quality
management systems at the firm level are fostered by a high-quality insti-
tutional environment (Correa et al., 2008); hence, similarly, we expect that
better institutions encourage the adoption of the private standard. Follow-
ing Herzfeld et al. (2011), we also used the logarithm of the GDP per capita
(GDPpc) to control for the level of economic development. For retailers
in developing countries there can be potential disadvantages in adopting
private standards due to prohibitive transaction costs. We also tested a pos-
sible non-linear relationship of the level of economic development using
the squared logarithm of the GDP per capita (GDPpc2).
In addition to the above variables proposed by Herzfeld et al. (2011), we
also used a set of variables particularly relevant for the analysis of GM-free
private standards.
First we used a variable on the presence in the country of green NGOs.
Their campaigns can influence the preferences of consumers (Grue`re et al.,
2009) and, as a consequence, the decision of the retailer to adopt GM-free
private standards. We considered two major green NGOs that are partic-
ularly active in anti-GMOs campaigns: ‘Greenpeace’ and ‘Friends of the
Earth’. The variable is equal to 0 if neither is present in the country, 1 if
only one is present, and 2 if both are present.
Second, to control for the structure of the supply chain and for the
bargaining power among producers and retailers (von Schlippenbach and
Teichmann, 2012), we used the variable Value added, calculated as the ratio
between agricultural value-added and food value-added (WDI). A com-
mon interpretation for this ratio is that lower values measure the ‘maturity’
of the agri-food sector and, other things being equal, it is affected by the
country’s economic development (EC, 2009). Developing countries often
have higher values of this ratio, because in the initial steps of the devel-
opment process their agricultural value-added grows at higher rates than
their food industry value-added, and vice versa in more developed coun-
tries. In our model we directly control for the level of development using
the GDP per capita; hence the Value added variable captures its differential
effect, which is the repartition of the value-added along the supply chain.
Since we control for development, higher Value added indicates that the
agricultural sector has greater participation in the creation of value along
the food chain. This increased role of the agricultural production in the
food value-chain results in the primary sector’s greater bargaining power,
thanks to better organization of the farmers, in the production of higher
quantities or quality (e.g., organic, fresh produce), or in the specialization
in niche products (EC, 2009).
Third, we tested the hypotheses formulated by the theoretical literature
on the political economy of mass media using the share of the public press
on total press (Press) taken from Djankov et al. (2003). Vigani and Olper
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(2013) show that, in rich countries, the competition between commercial
media induces information bias on food safety issues that translates into
a policy bias, namely more stringent GMO standards. According to the
theoretical arguments of Curtis et al. (2008) and the empirical evidence
of Vigani and Olper (2013), we expect that a higher share of public press
would negatively affect the adoption of GM-free private standards.
Fourth, we relaxed the assumption made in section 3.1 that the retail-
ers adopt the global standard in all the countries where it has stores,
adding two variables. The first, Internationalization, consists of the num-
ber of countries where the retailer has stores. It controls both for the
level of international competitiveness of the retailer and for the proba-
bility that, at increasing number of countries, the retailer adopts different
standards to satisfy different consumers’ preferences. The second, Heteroge-
neous standards, is a variable equal to 1 when we have the information that
the retailer adopts different GM standards in at least one country, and 0 oth-
erwise. This variable controls for unobserved heterogeneous standards for
those retailers for which we have proof that they use different standards.
Finally, in order to account for the interaction between private and
public GMO standards, we used an index on the restrictiveness of the
GMO public regulation (GMO index), developed by Vigani et al. (2012) and
Vigani and Olper (2013). The GMO index ranges between 0 and 1, where
higher values indicate a more restrictive GMO regulation. We computed
a regulatory distance between countries, obtained as the absolute devia-
tion of the GMO index between the home (i) and the operating country ( j),
namely GMOi j = |GMOi − GMO j |. We expect that higher heterogeneity in
regulation between countries induces the retailer to adopt the private stan-
dard in order to choose the quality level that minimizes the negative effects
on costs and revenues (McCluskey and Swinnen, 2004). Moreover, differ-
ent levels in the restrictiveness of the regulation may increase the incentives
of the retailer not to use GM ingredients in order to avoid product transfer
interruptions due to asynchronous and asymmetric approvals.
Because the GMO index may suffer from causality issues (the public
standard may influence the adoption of the private standard; contrarily,
the presence of private standards on the markets may influence the for-
mation of public standards), the GMO index will be treated as endogenous
and instrumented with the GMO index of the five neighboring countries
weighted by the distance (see Vigani et al., 2012).
With the exception of trade and GMO index variables, all the other
explanatory variables are taken for the year 2005 (or closest). This lagged
period with respect to the dependent variable, which refers to information
we collected in 2010, allows us to clean for further potential endogeneity
issues.
5. Econometric strategy
To explain the retailers’ choice between different GMO private standards,
we used a binary response model to measure the retailer’s probability to
opt for the GM-free private standard, taking into account the country’s
characteristics.
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The dependent variable yi j , can take on the following values:
yi j = 1 if the i th retailer in the j th country chooses a GM-free standard;
yi j = 0 otherwise.
The binary response probability is given by:
P(yi j = 1|x) = G(βo + β1xi j + . . . + β16xi j ) + εi j = G(β0 + xβ) (1)
where β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated and x represents a vec-
tor of country j ’s characteristics. Equation (1) is estimated using a Probit
model, with maximum likelihood estimators (MLE), where the probability
that retailer i will adopt a GM-free standard in country j depends on all the
exogenous variables that describe the country’s characteristics. We tested
three different specifications of this model. The first specification includes
in the vector x the following variables: (1) Common language; (2) Population;
(3) Road; (4) Telephone; (5) Agexpsh; (6) Agbilexp; (7) AgexpEUJ; (8) Rule of
law; (9) GDPpc; (10) GDPpc2; (11) Green; (12) Value added and (13) Press. The
selection of these variables relies on the hypotheses on the probability of
adopting GM-free standards discussed in the previous section.
In the second and third specification we augmented the vector x by
adding the variables (14) Internationalization and (15) Heterogeneous strat-
egy. The inclusion of these two variables allowed us to control for specific
limitations of our sample. Since it was not always possible to collect infor-
mation on each retailer brand in each country and we had to rely on
retailers’ global statements, we control for unobserved heterogeneity in the
GM-free standard of retailers with these two variables.
In the third specification we also added the bilateral variable (16), GMO
index, to observe the probability that different public standards across
countries affect the adoption of GM-free private standards by retailers.
As underlined in the theoretical literature, the use of private standards is
linked to the level of public standards. However, public standards can be
different between the home and operating country, affecting the retailer’s
strategy in adopting private standards.
The same theoretical literature highlights that private standards are
strategically used by firms to influence the output of the government in set-
ting public standards. Because of this double causality influence between
public and private standards, we also estimated equation (1) using an
instrumental variable Probit (IV Probit). In order to account for the poten-
tial endogeneity bias of the GMO index, we used the GMO index of the five
neighboring countries weighted by the distance as an instrument.
Finally, in all the specifications we included regional dummies (for EU
countries, Asia, Latin America, North America and Middle East) to control
for any other omitted factors.
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6. Results and discussion
The results of the econometric model are shown in table 6. Overall, the
magnitude of the coefficients and the marginal probability effects are con-
sistent across specifications; thus the results of columns 1, 2 and 3 tend
to confirm the stability of the basic model. Similar effects can be detected
in column 4, where using IV Probit we account for potential endogeneity
of the GMO index.9 Overall, the majority of the hypotheses developed in
section 4 are confirmed, in particular the important role of the structure
of the media sector and of the public policies in the adoption of GM-free
private standards by retailers.
Starting from historical and geographical variables, in columns 1, 2 and
3 we find that, when the home and operating country have a common
language, the likelihood that the retailer will adopt a GM-free standard
increases by about 22–24 per cent. The common language enhances the
spread of the standard, both as a result of easier transfer of new commercial
strategies and of shared consumers’ and firms’ characteristics. In contrast,
in columns 1 and 2 the country size has a significant negative effect on
the likelihood of adopting GM-free private standards. This can be due to a
more complex stratification of the (large) population that makes it difficult
to identify clear standards preferences.
Looking at the results of infrastructure variables, we obtain a deeper
understanding of the effect of the country size. In column 1, a higher share
of Roads reduces the likelihood of adopting GM-free standards. Each addi-
tional kilometer of roads per square km reduces the likelihood of adopting
GM-free private standards by about 10 per cent. The negative effect found
on Road is in line with the result of Herzfeld et al. (2011) that used a simi-
lar variable to study the adoption of GlobalGAP certificates by countries.
However, this effect loses significance in specification (2) and (3). Thus, we
have only weak evidence that a more complex infrastructure (in particular
in large countries) can reduce the incentive of adopting a GM-free stan-
dard due to higher compliance costs of segregation measures. In contrast, a
greater endowment of information infrastructure, such as telephone lines,
significantly increases the likelihood of adopting a GM-free standard, con-
firming the hypothesis that more information facilities enhance the firm’s
9 We used two tests to check for potential endogeneity of the GMO index in spec-
ification 3. Because the theory of the diagnostics is not developed for IV Probit
or any other non-linear model, we report tests results for the corresponding lin-
ear probability model, since instruments for diagnostics are a property of the first
stage, which is common both to IV linear and non-linear estimators. The first test
is the Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH), which tests for the consistency of the model.
Its null hypothesis is that the coefficient of residuals of the endogenous variable
is 0. From the results of the DWH test, we reject at the 1 per cent significance level
the null hypothesis that GMO index is exogenous, hence the OLS estimator is not
consistent. Second, we used the endogeneity test provided by the STATA com-
mand ivreg2 (defined as the difference of two Sargan–Hansen statistics). The null
hypothesis is that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as
exogenous. We reject the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent level, confirming that
the GMO index must be treated as endogenous.
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Table 6. Results from the Probit and IV Probit models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit Probit IV Probit
Dependent:
GM-free Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx
Historical and
geographical
conditions
Common 0.788∗∗ 0.229 0.910∗∗ 0.241 0.833∗∗ 0.217 0.607 0.220
language (0.356) (0.375) (0.385) (0.378)
Population −0.216∗ −0.063 −0.226∗ −0.060 −0.188 −0.049 −0.135 −0.053
(0.116) (0.128) (0.126) (0.119)
Infrastructure
Road −0.333∗∗ −0.097 −0.222 −0.059 −0.214 −0.056 −0.149 −0.059
(0.138) (0.141) (0.141) (0.139)
Telephone 0.062∗∗∗ 0.018 0.075∗∗∗ 0.020 0.073∗∗∗ 0.019 0.054∗∗ 0.021
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Trade
Agexpsh −3.859 −1.122 −4.303 −1.138 −3.124 −0.815 3.348 1.324
(6.405) (6.685) (6.904) (6.672)
(Continued.)
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Table 6. Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit Probit IV Probit
Dependent:
GM-free Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx Coeff. dy/dx
Agbilexp −0.039∗∗ −0.011 −0.006 −0.002 −0.015 −0.004 −0.035∗ −0.014
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
AgshEUJ 1.690 0.491 2.121 0.561 0.673 0.176 −5.515 −2.181
(5.084) (5.348) (5.554) (5.422)
Instit. quality and
GDP pc
Rule of law −0.515 −0.150 −0.444 −0.118 −0.388 −0.101 −0.242 −0.096
(0.326) (0.343) (0.348) (0.330)
GDPpc 0.817 0.238 2.068 0.547 2.137 0.558 2.496 0.987
(2.202) (2.338) (2.300) (2.188)
GDPpc2 −0.068 −0.020 −0.152 −0.040 −0.150 −0.039 −0.153 −0.061
(0.125) (0.132) (0.131) (0.125)
Additional
variables
Green 0.506 0.147 0.433 0.115 0.394 0.103 0.196 0.077
(0.333) (0.347) (0.360) (0.349)
Value added 0.062∗∗∗ 0.018 0.057∗∗∗ 0.015 0.065∗∗∗ 0.017 0.060∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
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Press −3.112∗∗∗ −0.905 −3.448∗∗∗ −0.912 −3.264∗∗∗ −0.851 −2.117∗∗ −0.837
(0.895) (0.942) (0.979) (0.998)
Internationalization −0.073∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.073∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.064∗∗∗ −0.025
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Heterogeneous
standards
−0.473∗∗ −0.125 −0.484∗∗ −0.126 −0.551∗∗∗ −0.217
(0.202) (0.201) (0.196)
GMO index 2.240∗ 0.584 6.677∗∗∗ 2.641
(1.190) (1.446)
Constant 1.765 −2.596 −4.209 −7.972
(11.090) (11.970) (11.710) (11.070)
Regional fixed
effects
YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood −151.360 −137.793 −134.984
Pseudo R2 0.251 0.318 0.328
Observations 295 295 293 293
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Each
regression includes regional fixed effects for Asia, the EU, the Middle East and North and Latin America.
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integration on the international competitive markets. The variable Telephone
is significant at the 1 per cent level in all the specifications.
The next group of variables suggests that the country trade position
can be an important factor affecting the retailer’s decision of adopting
GM-free standards. In particular, high trade flows between home and oper-
ating country have a negative effect on the probability of adopting GM-free
standards, even though with a small marginal effect. The Agbilexp vari-
able is always negative and significant at 5 per cent or 10 per cent in
columns 1 and 4 respectively. Indeed, well-established trade relationships
may oppose the introduction of a standard that increases trade costs due to
IP chains. On the contrary, the country’s comparative advantage in export-
ing agricultural products and the higher share of agricultural exports to
rich markets (i.e., European Union, Japan and the United States) do not
seem to play a decisive role in driving the adoption of GM-free private
standards.
None of the results on the quality of institutions, the level of develop-
ment and the presence of green NGOs is statistically confirmed, while the
role of the value chain and of the public press yielded important results.
The variable Value added is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level
in all specifications. With a larger share of agricultural value-added, the
likelihood of adopting the GM-free standard increases from 15 per cent to
24 per cent, depending on the specification. This confirms our hypothesis
and also the findings of the theoretical literature on vertical differentiation
strategies (von Schlippenbach and Teichmann, 2012). Better farmers’ orga-
nization and high-quality and niche productions, resulting in higher share
of the overall value of the food chain and a greater bargaining position
of upstream farmers, enhance producers’ ability to afford low productive
and more costly GM-free productions (Wesseler et al., 2011), and to obtain
production risks mitigation tools, such as supply contracts.
The hypotheses from the political economy of mass media are also con-
firmed. In all the specifications, results show that an increase in the public
ownership of the domestic newspapers decreases the likelihood of adopt-
ing GM-free standards, and this effect is significant and particularly strong.
This suggests that, since public media tend to transmit information with
a less negative view than private media in order to soften food safety
concerns (Curtis et al., 2008), public media tend to lower the consumers’
aversion towards GM products, reducing the incentives for retailers to sell
GM-free products.
Retailers with a higher level of internationalization and showing dif-
ferent private GM-free standards in different countries are less likely to
adopt GM-free standards. The coefficients on Internationalization and Hetero-
geneous strategy are always negative and statistically significant in columns
2, 3 and 4. This suggests that, if the retailer operates in numerous markets,
its willingness to adopt restrictive GM private standards (implying greater
segregation costs) is lower than for retailers dependent on smaller local
markets.
Finally, we tested the effect of the difference in biotech regulation
between the home and operating country. An increase in the regulatory
difference between countries strongly increases the probability that the
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retailer will adopt GM-free private standards. This result confirms the
hypotheses of the theoretical literature on the interaction between private
and public standards. In the presence of heterogeneous GMO regulations,
the retailer is more likely to adopt its own private standard, setting the
quality level that minimizes the negative effects on revenues. Moreover, in
order to exploit their private label products in different markets, the best
strategy is to sell products not containing GM ingredients. This allows the
retailer to avoid problems such as asynchronous or asymmetric approval
while transferring private label products from one country to the other,
allowing exploitation of the non-GM IP supply channel on a larger (interna-
tional) scale, without incurring different labeling thresholds. The adoption
of a single (restrictive) private standard on a large scale permits the retailer
to overcome compliance and logistic costs due to different public MQS
levels in different countries, obtaining homogeneous products for markets
with different regulations.
7. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on private standards,
investigating the determinants of the adoption of GM-free private stan-
dards by retailers.
First, we provide an original sample of GMOs private standards for
44 retailers, showing that these standards can be clustered into three
groups: retailers not adopting GM-free standards, retailers following the
public regulation on labeling threshold, and retailers using GM-free private
standards. Second, we tested four groups of variables from the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature on the private standard formation: historical
and geographical factors; infrastructure; sectorial conditions and the qual-
ity of institutions and economic development. As key results, we found
that a greater participation of the primary sector in the creation of value-
added in the food chain induces the adoption of GM-free private standards.
Moreover, a greater share of public media decreases the consumers’ aver-
sion towards GMOs, reducing the incentives for retailers to sell GM-free
products. Finally, uncertainties at public regulation level, in the form of
heterogeneous public standards between countries, induce the retailer to
adopt private standards in order to voluntarily choose the quality level that
minimizes the negative effects on revenues.
Besides identifying the factors inducing retailers to adopt GM-free stan-
dards, our results also raise important issues on the environmental and
economic sustainability of these standards. First, the environmental effects
of the GM-free production are questionable when the loss of the poten-
tial environmental benefits from GM crops is considered. GM crops can
have important direct and indirect environmental benefits, especially for
developing countries, such as the reduction of pesticide applications, lower
pressure on land use and lower on-farm fuel consumption and green-
house gas (GHG) emissions (Wesseler et al., 2011). All these environmental
benefits are potentially lost in the GM-free production.
Second, market actors deciding to participate in the GM-free supply
chain face two different sources of uncertainties, concerning commercial
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relationships and market stability. In the first case, the sourcing of non-GM
IP products by retailers requires long-term contracts for certified non-GM
products and it is costly due to segregation measures, lower productivity
and higher input use of non-GM crops. In the face of these problems, Euro-
pean retailers recently adopted two opposing strategies. The first strategy
consists of reinforcing the relationships with producers. For example, in
May 2013, a group of 13 European retailers launched the initiative ‘Brussels
Soy Declaration’, in order to support the Brazilian cultivation of GM-free
soybean, reducing costs and creating a stronger link with Brazilian pro-
ducers for the sourcing of GM-free products in the long run. In contrast,
the second strategy is to reverse the private standard. Indeed, in the last
two years several UK retailers (ASDA, Morrisons, Tesco, The Cooperative,
Marks & Spencer and Sainsbury) abandoned their GM-free requirements
on poultry products, because of the difficulties of UK farmers in sourc-
ing enough GM-free feed. The abandoning of the GM-free standard was
condemned by green groups, accusing the UK retailers of betraying their
promises to customers. Hence, GM-free private standards are abandoned
because they are not sustainable in the long run, but at a high cost in
terms of public image and creating unreliable commercial relationships
with producers.
The second source of uncertainty, market stability, derives from the pos-
sible shrinking of EU imports of GM-free protein crops. The EU is currently
a net importer of non-GM soya, but the EU is seeking higher self-sufficiency
through the recent reform of the CAP that included voluntary ‘coupled’
direct payments for protein crops. In Europe there are no authorized
GM protein crops; hence any cultivable protein crop is non-GM, and the
expected higher internal production of non-GM soya consequent to sub-
sidization would reduce the EU demand for GM-free protein crops from
foreign exporting countries.
What is most interesting is that all the above-described scenarios have
large economic impacts on both farmers and market actors in develop-
ing countries deciding to produce GM-free. On the one hand, farmers
in developing countries can lose important economic benefits derived
from the use of GM crops, such as increased yields and simplified crop
management and, consequently, lose important contributions toward food
security. On the other hand, the creation of a non-GM supply chain gen-
erates fixed and variable costs for market actors in developing countries,
potentially balanced by price premiums and market access. Therefore,
an unexpected break of the GM-free production (either due to companies
abandoning the GM-free standard or to lower market demand) would pro-
voke the effective loss of the investments on segregation and certification
infrastructures.
Given the above-mentioned economic and environmental effects of
GM-free private standards, more research is needed in this field. In par-
ticular, the effects of the adoption of GM-free private standards by food
multinationals and global fast-food restaurants is widely ignored in the lit-
erature, despite the fact that these companies are vital in shaping the global
agri-food supply and demand.
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